Beyond Longer Waiting Periods: The Technology & Accountability Nigeria Needs To Stop SIM Fraud

By TOSI ORE

A Digital Economy Built on a Vulnerable Identifier

NIGERIA’S growing dependence on mobile technology has turned telephone numbers into powerful digital identifiers. They connect subscribers to banking applications, payment platforms, government services, social media accounts and identity-verification systems. Yet, as mobile numbers move from one subscriber to another, the systems attached to them do not always move at the same pace.

This disconnect has exposed consumers to financial fraud, identity theft and, in some cases, wrongful suspicion by law enforcement agencies. The problem is not necessarily that telecom operators recycle inactive numbers. Rather, it is that the reassignment process can leave a previous subscriber’s digital footprint attached to a number now used by someone else.

The consequences are evident in several reported Nigerian cases. Mariam Titilayo Ibrahim, a National Youth Service Corps member in Akure, was arrested in October 2025 after police allegedly linked her newly acquired Airtel number to a kidnapping and murder case from January 2024. Investigators later had to establish that she obtained the line after the original incident.

In another case, Nnenna Okorie said she lost more than ₦3 million from her Access Bank account after her former number was reassigned. Separately, Delta State trader Anthony Okolie spent 10 weeks in detention in 2020 after activating a SIM card previously used by Hanan Buhari, the daughter of former President Muhammadu Buhari.

Although these cases differ in their details, they raise a common question about the management of digital identity: when a mobile number changes hands, how effectively do the institutions that rely on it recognise the change?

The Financial & Social Cost of Telecom Fraud

The economic impact extends beyond individual victims. Data attributed to PwC and the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) put Nigeria’s telecom-related fraud losses at approximately ₦12.5 billion over four years. Global losses reportedly exceeded $38.95 billion during the same period.

PwC has called on telecom operators to strengthen their anti-fraud systems through artificial intelligence, machine learning and regular audits. Its analysis identifies several threats, including SIM-swap fraud, SIM-box fraud, SMS phishing, subscription fraud, scam calls and international revenue-share fraud.

These categories involve different techniques, but many exploit weaknesses in verification and monitoring. Fraudsters may impersonate subscribers, manipulate registration procedures, compromise staff or exploit gaps between telecom and financial systems.

PwC’s Global Crime Survey also found that nearly two-thirds of technology, media and telecommunications companies had experienced fraud, with cybercrime accounting for half of those incidents. The firm has further cited a figure indicating that 59 per cent of Nigerian e-banking customers had fallen victim to scams.

These figures point to a wider challenge involving digital payments and telecommunications infrastructure. However, the precise definitions, reporting periods and methodologies behind each statistic matter. Telecom-related fraud is not a single category, and the figures should not be interpreted as proof that every reported loss resulted from SIM recycling.

How the Number Reassignment Process Works

Under the NCC’s Quality of Service Business Rules 2024, prepaid mobile lines that generate no revenue for six continuous months must be deactivated. If inactivity continues for another six months, the numbers become eligible for recycling and reassignment.

Qualifying revenue-generating events include calls, text and multimedia messages, mobile data use and USSD transactions.

The policy serves an operational purpose. Telephone numbers are a finite resource, and operators need to return dormant numbers to circulation rather than allow them to remain unused indefinitely. Gbenga Adebayo, chairman of the Association of Licensed Telecom Operators of Nigeria (ALTON), has explained that subscribers do not own their SIM cards outright and that operators recycle numbers to conserve resources and reduce costs.

Nevertheless, a number’s availability for reassignment does not mean its previous digital associations have disappeared. Banks may still retain it as a customer’s registered contact, while online services may continue to use it for password recovery or one-time passwords.

The resulting risk is a failure of coordination. The telecom operator may have correctly reassigned the number, but another institution may still treat the new subscriber as the person who originally registered it.

NIN-SIM Linkage Cannot Solve Every Problem

Nigeria’s digital identification framework was designed to improve traceability. The Nigerian Communications Act 2003 gives the NCC authority to protect consumers and service providers, while the SIM Card Registration Regulations 2022 provide for a central database of subscriber information.

The mandatory linkage of the National Identification Number (NIN) to SIM cards strengthens the relationship between a subscriber and a mobile line. However, that relationship must be updated when the number is reassigned.

A new subscriber can register a recycled number using their own NIN, yet banks and other digital services may retain the previous subscriber’s details. In such circumstances, the telecom database may correctly identify the new holder while other systems continue to recognise an outdated association.

This exposes a fundamental distinction between identifying a current subscriber and managing a person’s digital identity across multiple institutions. A central registration database cannot, by itself, ensure that every financial account, government portal and online platform has removed the former user’s number.

The challenge therefore requires interoperability: systems must exchange accurate updates, recognise changes in subscriber status and apply appropriate safeguards when a number is reassigned.

Why Longer Waiting Periods May Not Be Enough

In response to the risks, the House of Representatives urged the NCC to extend the waiting period before inactive phone numbers are reassigned from the existing 12-month period to 18 months.

The resolution followed a motion sponsored by Billy Osawaru, who represents Orhionmwon/Uhunmwode Federal Constituency in Edo State. Lawmakers argued that the additional six months could strengthen protection against fraud, identity theft and wrongful criminal allegations associated with reassigned numbers.

Osawaru also proposed publicly announcing numbers due for reassignment in national newspapers and notifying the police once or twice a year. The aim was to improve transparency and help authorities resolve cases in which a number’s previous history is wrongly attributed to its new holder.

However, a longer waiting period addresses only part of the problem. It may provide former subscribers with additional time to recover a number or update their records, but it cannot guarantee that old banking and digital-service links will be removed.

A number could remain unused for 18 months and still be connected to a neglected bank profile. Conversely, a shorter waiting period could be managed more safely if every relevant institution received reliable notification and automatically updated its records.

The effectiveness of reform will therefore depend on the entire reassignment process, not simply the number of months a line remains dormant.

A Proposed Airtime Grace Period Addresses a Different Risk

The NCC has also consulted on a proposal to introduce a 12-month grace period for subscribers to reclaim unused airtime or data from deactivated lines, provided they can prove ownership.

The proposed arrangement would require telecom operators to audit churned numbers and document unclaimed recharges, while preventing operators from monetising those credits.

Such a measure could strengthen consumer protection concerning unused telecom balances. Nevertheless, it addresses a different issue from the risks associated with banking and digital identity.

Recovering airtime does not automatically remove a recycled number from a former subscriber’s bank account, nor does it prevent authentication messages from reaching the new holder. The policy would therefore need to operate alongside stronger controls governing account delinking, number reassignment and cross-sector information sharing.

NCC & CBN Seek a Coordinated Response

Recognising that telecom and financial systems are closely connected, the NCC launched the Telecom Identity Risk Management System (TIRMS) in March 2026. The platform is intended to help banks, fintech companies and regulators verify SIM status in real time, flag suspicious numbers and reduce the misuse of recycled lines and fraudulent devices.

In April 2026, the NCC and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen cooperation on telecom-related fraud, consumer protection and payment integrity. The arrangement included a Telecom Identity Risk Management portal and joint committees to improve coordination.

NCC Executive Vice Chairman Aminu Maida warned that fraudulent SIM use was eroding public trust in digital platforms and undermining identity systems built over the years. CBN Governor Olayemi Cardoso also stressed the importance of collaboration to protect consumers and maintain financial integrity.

These steps acknowledge that no single institution controls the entire risk. Telecom operators manage numbers and SIM registration; banks protect financial accounts; fintech companies operate payment services; and digital platforms manage their own authentication processes.

However, the existence of a coordination framework is only the beginning. Regulators must establish whether relevant institutions are participating effectively, whether number changes trigger timely updates and whether the safeguards produce measurable reductions in fraud.

Experts Propose Real-Time Delinking & Stronger Authentication

Akin Adegoke, chief digital officer of Lotus Bank, argues that banks and telecom operators should establish a secure, real-time notification system for SIM swaps and number reassignment.

Under his proposal, a change in SIM status would automatically alert the relevant bank. The bank could then increase authentication requirements or temporarily restrict high-risk transactions until it verified the account holder’s identity.

Adegoke also argues that where a reassigned number remains linked to a bank account, the system should automatically treat the mismatch as a risk requiring further checks. The response, he says, should not depend solely on customers discovering the problem and reporting it.

Fintech specialist Goke Adekanmbi advocates a more integrated digital public infrastructure in which databases and services communicate through mandatory, instantaneous signals.

He has proposed a temporary, 24-hour financial freeze following a detected SIM swap, alongside biometric checks before a swap is approved. He also recommends that banks check the NCC registry before processing certain high-value USSD transactions and that operators initiate a system-wide delinking process before reassigning numbers.

These measures are expert proposals rather than established nationwide requirements. Their implementation would require clear legal authority, technical standards, reliable identity verification and safeguards against wrongful account restrictions.

A system that protects customers must also provide accessible procedures for resolving false alerts and restoring legitimate access quickly. Otherwise, stronger controls could create new difficulties for subscribers who depend on mobile banking for everyday transactions.

Telecom Operators Acknowledge the Post-Reassignment Risk

Tobechukwu Okigbo, MTN Nigeria’s chief corporate services and sustainability officer, has argued that the risks associated with poor SIM management extend beyond telecommunications.

Okigbo said the convergence of telecom and financial services has made phone numbers highly sensitive digital credentials. He also acknowledged that problems can arise after reassignment when banks, fintech firms, merchant platforms and other services continue to retain a former subscriber’s number.

Even when a customer changes a number, he explained, not every institution updates its records immediately. As a result, old contact details may remain in banking profiles or merchant accounts.

His position reinforces the case for direct cooperation between operators and financial institutions. If a number is reassigned, affected services need a reliable way to receive the update, identify obsolete links and verify the correct account holder before permitting sensitive transactions.

At the same time, telecom operators must ensure that registration and reassignment records are accurate, accessible to authorised institutions and protected against misuse. Regulators must also establish accountability when an operator, bank or agent fails to comply with required procedures.

Enforcement & Registration Integrity Remain Essential

Kehinde Aluko, a telecom expert and former NITEL employee, attributes the persistence of SIM-related fraud partly to weak enforcement. He argues that the central challenge is not simply the timing of number recycling but the procedures operators follow and the coordination they maintain with banks and digital platforms.

Deolu Ogunbanjo, president of the National Association of Telecom Subscribers of Nigeria (NATCOMs), has also criticised alleged irregularities in SIM registration. He claims that some agents compromise verification procedures, including through the use of other people’s photographs or identity documents.

Ogunbanjo also points to consumer behaviour, noting that some subscribers favour roadside registration agents for convenience rather than using accredited outlets with appropriate authentication facilities.

These concerns underline the need for stronger oversight of registration channels. Operators should audit agents, investigate suspicious registrations and maintain verifiable records. Regulators should apply penalties where investigations establish non-compliance, while law-enforcement agencies should ensure that their own systems distinguish a number’s previous user from its current subscriber.

Consumers also need clear information about safe registration and number changes. However, public education cannot compensate for weaknesses that only operators, banks and regulators have the authority and technical capacity to correct.

Artificial Intelligence Can Help, but It Is Not a Substitute for Accountability

PwC recommends that telecom companies invest in advanced anti-fraud systems, including artificial intelligence and machine learning, to improve detection and response.

Such tools may help identify unusual transaction patterns, suspicious SIM changes and potentially fraudulent registrations. Yet their effectiveness depends on accurate data, proper integration and timely human intervention.

Artificial intelligence can also generate false alerts or fail to identify unfamiliar fraud patterns. Consequently, automated systems must be supported by reliable records, transparent procedures and accessible channels through which affected customers can challenge decisions.

The objective should not be to deploy technology for its own sake. It should be to ensure that a change in subscriber identity triggers the right checks across the systems that rely on that identity.

Protecting Digital Identity Requires Shared Responsibility

Nigeria’s response to SIM-related fraud must move beyond warnings to consumers and isolated regulatory initiatives. A comprehensive framework should require timely notification of number changes, effective delinking of former subscribers, stronger authentication for sensitive transactions and coordinated monitoring across telecom and financial services.

It should also establish clear responsibility when fraud occurs. Customers need accessible complaint channels, prompt investigations and fair procedures for resolving wrongful attribution. Banks and telecom operators must be able to demonstrate that they followed required safeguards, while regulators must publish evidence of enforcement and the outcomes of corrective measures.

The reassignment of inactive numbers serves a legitimate operational purpose. However, that process should never allow an old digital identity to follow a number indefinitely or expose a new subscriber to the actions of a previous user.

The challenge is therefore broader than extending the recycling period. It is about ensuring that Nigeria’s digital infrastructure recognises the difference between a telephone number and the person who uses it.

As mobile numbers become increasingly central to financial and public services, the security of the digital economy will depend on whether institutions can manage that distinction accurately, consistently and in real time.