Women’s Accounts, Coded Transfers, Crowdfunding: NFIU Exposes New Terror Financing Tactics
By TOSI ORE
TERRORIST financiers are increasingly exploiting women’s bank accounts, disconnected phone numbers and crowdfunding platforms to move illicit funds and conceal the identities of their real beneficiaries, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has revealed.
The Unit disclosed this in its 2025 Annual Report, which examined emerging trends in terrorist financing and other financial crimes recorded during the year.
According to the report, male terrorist commanders and logistics managers sometimes control accounts opened in the names of wives, sisters and female associates. The arrangement allows them to distance themselves from suspicious transactions.
NFIU described the practice as a form of “identity laundering”. It said cultural assumptions that women are less likely to attract suspicion could make such accounts attractive to terrorist financiers.
In some cases, the women whose names appear on the accounts may not even know the scale or nature of the transactions taking place.
Men may retain the ATM cards, mobile banking credentials and PINs linked to the accounts. As a result, the actual beneficiaries remain hidden behind the identities of the registered account holders.
The financial intelligence agency also identified the use of improperly linked telephone numbers as another method of concealing illicit transactions.
Facilitators, it said, can use pre-registered SIM cards, numbers registered to deceased persons or SIMs connected to unrelated individuals. Such practices can weaken the connection between a bank account, its BVN and the person actually controlling the funds.
When investigators trace a suspicious transaction through the associated phone number, they may therefore encounter an unrelated person rather than the real facilitator.
NFIU further raised concerns about coded transaction descriptions. According to the report, some terrorist networks, including those associated with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), use transaction narrations as part of their internal accounting systems.
Some transfers reportedly contain detailed descriptions of logistics payments. Others use seemingly harmless words, coded expressions and alphanumeric combinations.
The Unit said facilitators may also switch languages to avoid automated banking systems designed to detect terms associated with terrorism.
Such techniques can make suspicious transfers appear ordinary while allowing funds to reach intended recipients.
Beyond conventional banking channels, NFIU identified crowdfunding and international remittance services as another emerging vulnerability.
The report described a four-stage model in which overseas facilitators launch social media campaigns disguised as humanitarian or educational appeals. Donors then send relatively small amounts through payment platforms or designated bank accounts.
Hundreds of contributors may each donate modest sums, making individual transactions less likely to trigger automated anti-money-laundering alerts.
The money can subsequently be consolidated in a master account before being divided and transferred through international money-transfer operators and remittance applications.
NFIU said Nigerian money mules could include students, small-business operators and relatives. Recipients may then convert the funds into cash, purchase items with legitimate and illicit uses, or transfer the money through mobile banking to logistics managers and field operatives.
The findings highlight the growing sophistication of terrorist financing networks and the challenge facing financial institutions and security agencies.
They also point to the need for stronger monitoring of beneficial ownership, SIM registration, digital payments and crowdfunding activities as authorities seek to disrupt the financial networks supporting terrorism.
