Scrapped On Paper, Funded In Billions: The High Cost Of Nigeria’s Expanding Government
By JOANNA ILUSANMI
A Reform Report That Refuses to Disappear
THE Stephen Oronsaye Report has survived three administrations, several reviews and repeated promises of implementation. Fourteen years after its submission, however, the fundamental problems it identified remain embedded in Nigeria’s public-sector system.
The report was designed to confront one of the country’s most persistent governance challenges: the cost of maintaining a vast network of ministries, departments, agencies, commissions and parastatals.
Its findings were clear. Nigeria had too many institutions performing overlapping functions, maintaining separate administrative structures and competing for limited public resources.
The committee recommended a substantial restructuring of the federal bureaucracy, including mergers, abolitions and transfers of functions.
Yet, Nigeria’s government structure has continued to evolve without a clear and publicly measurable record of how much duplication has actually been removed.
The result is a paradox. Agencies targeted for abolition remain in the budget, while new ministries and commissions continue to emerge.
The Rise of a Bigger Government
President Bola Tinubu’s administration initially appeared prepared to confront the issue.
The government’s 2024 announcement on the implementation of the Oronsaye Report generated expectations that Nigeria would finally begin reducing the size of its federal bureaucracy.
However, the implementation plan stopped short of the report’s most extensive recommendations.
The government approved selected mergers, subsuming arrangements, relocations and a small number of scrappings.
At the same time, the administration created and expanded institutions in other sectors.
The result has been an expanding government structure that now places additional pressure on public finances.
Six ministries and five regional development commissions established or expanded under the current administration received combined allocations of approximately ₦1.13 trillion in the 2026 budget.
That amount alone illustrates the financial consequences of creating new institutional structures in an economy facing persistent revenue challenges and competing demands for infrastructure, education, healthcare and social services.
The New Cost Centres
The Ministry of Livestock Development received approximately ₦81.19 billion, while the Ministry of Regional Development was allocated ₦27.23 billion.
The Ministry of Art, Culture, Tourism and Creative Economy received about ₦70.3 billion.
The Ministry of Steel Development received ₦21.52 billion, while the Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy was allocated about ₦149.2 billion.
The Ministry of Gas Resources also added another administrative layer to the broader petroleum sector.
Perhaps more significant are the financial implications of the regional development commissions.
The four major new regional commissions and the North-West Development Commission collectively received hundreds of billions of naira.
Their establishment reflects an attempt to address regional development concerns. However, their emergence has also revived debate about whether new institutions offer better solutions than strengthening existing agencies.
The question is particularly important because Nigeria already operates numerous ministries and development institutions with responsibilities connected to infrastructure, agriculture, economic development and social intervention.
Creating another institution may address a political or regional demand, but it also creates fresh requirements for personnel, offices, equipment, administration and project funding.
The Mystery of the ‘Scrapped’ Agencies
Nigeria’s public-sector reform problem is perhaps most visible in institutions that exist in a state of administrative uncertainty.
Some agencies have been recommended for abolition. Others have been announced for merger. Yet, several remain visible in subsequent federal budgets.
The Pension Transitional Arrangement Directorate is one such example.
The Oronsaye Committee recommended transferring its functions to the Ministry of Finance. Nevertheless, the directorate has continued to operate independently.
The National Productivity Centre presents an even larger fiscal question.
Earlier estimates suggested that abolishing the agency could save billions of naira. Instead, its 2026 allocation reportedly stands at approximately ₦110.68 billion.
The provision is striking not only because of its size but because of the variety of projects listed within the agency’s budget.
Where an institution’s expenditure extends far beyond its original mandate, the issue is no longer simply whether the agency should exist. It also becomes necessary to examine how public institutions are being used to distribute and implement projects.
The Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission, despite plans for its merger with the Bureau of Public Enterprises, also continues to appear as a standalone entity in budget documents.
NALDA and the Federal Character Commission have similarly remained operational despite earlier recommendations affecting their institutional future.
Why Government Reform Often Stops on Paper
Nigeria’s experience shows that restructuring government is easier to announce than to complete.
An executive decision may begin the process, but legal and administrative realities determine whether the reform succeeds.
Many federal agencies were created through legislation. Eliminating them may therefore require legislative action.
Their employees also have legal rights, while their assets, offices and ongoing programmes must be managed.
These complications create opportunities for reform to slow down.
Political interests can also make institutional reform more difficult.
Government agencies create positions and influence. They provide employment and administrative authority. For political leaders, therefore, eliminating an agency can create opposition from individuals and groups who benefit from its continued existence.
Dr. Yunana Bature argued that the problem is no longer identifying Nigeria’s institutional weaknesses.
The more difficult question concerns whether government is willing to confront the interests that sustain them.
That observation goes to the heart of the Oronsaye debate.
The report has existed for 14 years. Nigeria does not lack recommendations. What it has lacked is a consistently executed plan backed by legislation, transparent timelines and measurable results.
Counting Savings, Not Announcements
A central weakness in Nigeria’s public-sector reform process is the absence of a widely available baseline showing the cost of the institutions targeted for restructuring.
Without that information, measuring success becomes difficult.
A government may announce the merger of several agencies. However, unless the public knows their previous personnel costs, overhead expenditure and capital allocations, it becomes difficult to determine whether the merger produced actual savings.
This is why financial experts increasingly argue that the reform debate must move beyond counting institutions.
The real measure should be the cost of performing government functions.
If an agency disappears but its employees, offices, vehicles and administrative expenses simply move elsewhere, then the cost-saving objective may remain unrealised.
Tolulope Alayande argued that Nigeria should focus more on eliminating overlapping functions than merely changing institutional names.
That approach could reshape the debate.
The objective should not necessarily be the smallest possible government. Nigeria still needs institutions capable of regulating industries, building infrastructure and delivering public services.
Instead, the objective should be a more efficient government.
A Leaner State or an Expanding One?
The ₦1.13 trillion allocated to newly established or expanded ministries and commissions highlights the broader policy dilemma.
Nigeria wants greater economic growth and stronger public services. It also needs to reduce the cost of governance and improve fiscal sustainability.
Those objectives can sometimes conflict.
Creating new institutions may respond to genuine problems. A new ministry may focus attention on an important sector. A regional commission may address historical inequalities.
However, every new institution carries a financial cost.
The challenge is to determine whether new structures create value that existing institutions cannot provide.
Without that discipline, government expansion can produce an increasingly fragmented bureaucracy where several agencies pursue similar objectives through separate offices and budgets.
For a country facing significant development needs, the consequences extend beyond accounting.
Every naira spent maintaining duplicated administrative structures is money that could potentially support roads, schools, hospitals, power projects or employment programmes.
The Oronsaye Question Remains
Fourteen years after the report was submitted, Nigeria remains caught between reform and expansion.
The government has repeatedly acknowledged the need to reduce duplication. Yet, its institutional structure continues to grow.
Agencies recommended for abolition remain funded. Proposed mergers have not always translated into complete institutional consolidation. Meanwhile, new ministries and commissions continue to enter the federal structure.
The Oronsaye Report, therefore, remains more than an old document gathering dust in government archives.
It has become a symbol of Nigeria’s wider struggle to convert policy diagnosis into implementation.
The country has repeatedly identified the disease. It has produced prescriptions. It has announced treatment.
What remains uncertain is whether it is prepared to complete the course.
Until Nigeria can demonstrate repealed laws, dismantled structures, reduced administrative costs and independently verifiable savings, the promise of public-sector rationalisation will remain incomplete.
The question after 14 years is no longer whether Nigeria needs reform.
The evidence has long answered that question.
The real test is whether the country can finally build a government that spends less on maintaining itself and more on delivering results to its citizens.
