Burning Under The Law: Inside Nigeria’s Gas-Flare Crisis & Weak Enforcement

By ESTHER McWILLIS-IKHIDE & AUGUSTINA McSOLOMON-OGHAKPERUO
When the Flames Never Die: How Gas Flaring Persists Despite Nigeria’s Anti-Flare Laws
FOR Rose Ordu, the night sky over Umuechem in Rivers State has never truly gone dark.
At 65, the farmer has watched the orange glow of gas flares become part of the landscape around her community. The flames burn long after sunset, casting an eerie light over an environment where farming once provided a dependable livelihood.
But for Ordu, the flare is not simply a distant industrial installation. It is a presence that reaches into her farm, her crops and her family’s daily life.
Standing on her cassava and vegetable farm in April, she pointed towards an oil facility operated by Heirs Energies under Oil Mining Lease 17. The facility sits only a few hundred metres away.
According to a Google Earth analysis, the nearest residential building is about 328 metres from the flare facility.
Ordu believes the heat has affected her crops.
“When I plant vegetables, they don’t grow well because of the heat from the flare,” she said. “They wither quickly. Even when I apply fertiliser, they are still unhealthy.”
Then she asked a question that captures the frustration of many oil-producing communities: why continue burning the gas when the community itself has lived without electricity for more than three years?
“They should convert it to electricity instead of wasting it,” she said.
A Law Meant to Change the Story
For decades, gas flaring has represented one of the most visible environmental costs of Nigeria’s oil industry.
Oil companies burn associated gas during production, releasing greenhouse gases and other pollutants into the atmosphere while wasting a resource that could otherwise support electricity generation, industrial activity and other economic uses.
The Petroleum Industry Act, signed in August 2021, appeared poised to change that reality.
Section 108 required companies producing natural gas to submit Flare Elimination and Monetisation Plans within 12 months of the law taking effect. The plans were expected to show how operators would eliminate routine flaring and put associated gas to productive use.
Two years later, the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission strengthened the framework with the Gas Flaring, Venting and Methane Emissions (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulations, 2023.
The regulations introduced additional obligations. Operators must maintain daily records of gas flaring and venting, submit monthly reports, develop methane inventories, establish systems for detecting and repairing leaks, report fugitive methane emissions and enter into Milestone Development Agreements with the regulator.
On paper, the framework was formidable.
On the ground, however, the flames continued.
Three Months of Following the Smoke
Over three months, communities in Rivers and Akwa Ibom states were visited as part of an investigation into the implementation of Nigeria’s anti-flaring laws.
Residents living near facilities operated by Heirs Energies, Aradel Holdings, Sterling Oil Exploration and Energy Production Company and Frontier Oil described similar experiences.
They spoke about intense heat, damaged roofs, declining farm yields and health concerns.
The investigation also examined government data from the NUPRC, the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency.
The Petroleum Industry Act and its implementing regulations were reviewed alongside corporate sustainability reports and methane disclosures.
Detailed questions were also sent to the companies and the regulator.
The findings painted a troubling picture.
Despite statutory obligations designed to reduce routine gas flaring, flare volumes increased at several assets after the new regulations came into force.
Some companies did not provide key environmental documents requested by the newspaper. These included Flare Elimination and Monetisation Plans, methane inventories and evidence of implementation milestones.
In one significant case, an operator acknowledged that it had failed to meet two major regulatory requirements.
Yet there was no known sanction.
Living Beside the Flame
About 25 kilometres from Umuechem, another flare burns continuously in Mbodo, Ikwerre Local Government Area, where Heirs Energies also operates within OML 17.
For residents, the consequences are not abstract.
Emechukwu Handsome, secretary of the Mbodo Group Host Communities Development Trust, said the heat affects their homes.
“Because of our closeness to the flare site, our roofs deteriorate faster,” he said.
A medical outreach organised by Heirs Energies also revealed another dimension of the problem.
The organisers expected only a modest turnout for eye examinations. Instead, Handsome said, the number of residents seeking attention was more than three times higher than anticipated.
Health workers at the community’s primary health centre identified itchy eyes, chest pain, skin rashes and malaria among recurring complaints.
They did not, however, directly attribute those illnesses to gas flaring.
Scientific literature nevertheless provides grounds for concern.
Studies have associated prolonged residence near flare sites with higher incidences of eye irritation, chest pain, breathing difficulties and skin irritation.
That does not establish that every illness in a host community comes from gas flaring. It does, however, reinforce concerns about prolonged exposure to emissions from active flare sites.
Heirs Energies Under Scrutiny
The environmental questions become sharper when government records are compared with corporate commitments.
Heirs Energies says it is reducing greenhouse gas emissions through gas commercialisation, off-gas utilisation and the gradual elimination of routine flaring.
Government data reviewed in the investigation presents a less reassuring picture.
Analysis of NEITI’s 2022 Oil and Gas Industry Report and NUPRC’s 2023 and 2024 operational reports showed that gas flaring from OML 17 increased in both years after 2022.
The increase was particularly striking in 2024.
Flare volumes rose by 140.3 per cent compared with 2023. At the same time, the company moved from 16th among 45 reporting companies in 2023 to ninth among 46 operators in 2024.
Methane figures also raised concerns.
NEITI’s latest published methane inventory for 2023 put Heirs Energies’ reported methane emissions at 217.36 million kilogrammes. That was the second-highest figure among reporting operators.
The newspaper sought explanations and requested key documents from the company, including its flare data, methane inventory, FEMP, Milestone Development Agreement and environmental compliance records.
After the initial enquiry and a reminder, the company acknowledged the request and promised a response.
No substantive response had been received at the time of filing.
Aradel & the Question of Routine Flaring
The investigation then moved to Ogbele in Ahoada East Local Government Area.
There, two flare stacks burn over a community where Aradel Holdings has operated OML 54 for more than two decades.
Aradel’s 2025 annual report describes Ogbele as the cornerstone of its production base. The company also operates an 11,000-barrel-per-day refinery at the site.
Residents, however, described persistent heat, skin irritation and breathing difficulties.
NUPRC records show Aradel is not among Nigeria’s biggest gas-flaring operators. Yet the data indicates that flaring from OML 54 increased in each year after the 2023 regulations took effect.
The company’s methane disclosures raised another question.
NEITI records showed exactly 133.52 million kilogrammes of methane emissions for Aradel in both 2022 and 2023.
The newspaper asked the company to explain the identical figures and provide its FEMP, regulatory approvals, Milestone Development Agreement, methane-reduction plans, environmental monitoring reports and gas-flaring logs.
Aradel did not provide a written response.
During a virtual meeting, however, the company said it had stopped routine flaring in 2012. A company executive described the continuing flames observed at Ogbele as a “technical flare”.
The newspaper subsequently asked the company to reconcile that position with its 2025 annual report, which contained a commitment to eliminate routine flaring by 2026/2027.
Aradel promised a detailed written response.
Despite reminders, that response had not arrived when the investigation was filed.
Sterling Oil & a Growing Data Gap
In Egbolom, Abua/Odual Local Government Area, another flare burns continuously.
Residents said the heat becomes particularly difficult at night.
About 200 kilometres away, in Eastern Obolo, Akwa Ibom State, Sterling Oil operates the Utapate field.
Commercial production began there in 2024. Satellite data reviewed for the investigation showed a sharp increase in flare activity.
Reported gas flaring rose from 4.9 million standard cubic feet in 2024 to eight million standard cubic feet in 2025.
By the end of May 2026, the figure had already reached 7.2 million standard cubic feet.
The trend raised questions about how effectively the 2023 regulations were changing operational practices.
Publicly available government reports did not provide enough asset-level data to independently assess Sterling Oil’s complete flaring performance. Satellite observations therefore offered an additional, though less precise, indicator.
The company did not respond to detailed enquiries seeking its methane data, FEMP, regulatory approvals, Milestone Development Agreement and environmental compliance records.
That silence matters because Sterling Oil publicly says it is committed to reducing environmental impacts and emissions.
One Company Opened Its Books
Frontier Oil Limited, operated by Savannah Energy, took a different approach.
The company provided a detailed response to some of the questions.
Its disclosures offered insight into the technical difficulties associated with gas flaring. They also revealed what may be an even bigger problem: enforcement.
Frontier operates the Uquo field in Akwa Ibom, where gas is flared near Edo and Uqua Isidoho communities.
Residents said the heat has affected farming. Friday Edoho, whose farm lies close to the facility, linked declining cassava yields to the excessive heat.
Frontier disputed aspects of the flaring picture presented by government records.
The company said its gas flaring declined steadily between 2021 and 2024. However, analysis of NEITI and NUPRC data showed that flaring fell in 2023 before rising by 59.4 per cent in 2024.
Frontier attributed the increase to unusually high associated gas production from a new oil well. According to the company, production exceeded compressor capacity, leading to higher flaring.
It said compressor upgrades, lower production and improved maintenance later helped reduce emissions.
Then came a striking admission.
Compliance Without Consequences
Frontier acknowledged that it had not submitted fugitive methane emission reports required by the 2023 regulations between 2021 and May 2026.
It also said it submitted its Flare Elimination and Monetisation Plan in 2025, about two years after the applicable deadline.
The company said the NUPRC had not approved the plan and that it had therefore not executed the required Milestone Development Agreement.
More significantly, Frontier said the regulator neither issued a notice of violation nor imposed a sanction over the failures.
That admission shifts the focus from individual operators to the regulatory system itself.
Where Does Accountability Begin?
Across Umuechem, Mbodo, Ogbele, Abua/Odual, Eastern Obolo and Esit Eket, the story repeated itself in different forms.
The flames remained.
Farmers complained about declining yields. Residents described heat and discomfort. Communities raised concerns about pollution and possible health effects.
Meanwhile, government data showed increased flaring at several assets during a period when operators were expected to begin implementing measures to reduce routine flaring.
Three companies did not provide key environmental records requested for the investigation.
Frontier Oil responded, but its disclosures revealed apparent regulatory non-compliance without known enforcement action.
Environmental advocates argue that such opacity weakens public accountability.
Umo Isuaikoh of the Peace Point Development Foundation said companies extracting public resources should disclose their environmental impacts and explain what they are doing to reduce them.
Without such information, he argued, communities, regulators and investors cannot independently determine whether operators are meeting their obligations.
The central issue, therefore, extends beyond the four companies.
Nigeria has laws. It has regulations. It has reporting requirements and environmental commitments.
But if operators can miss deadlines, fail to submit mandatory reports and continue flaring without clear regulatory consequences, the bigger question becomes unavoidable:
What happens when environmental laws exist on paper, but the system responsible for enforcing them does not act with equal force?
That question leads directly to the regulator and the federal government.
The second part of the investigation examines the NUPRC’s role, regulatory delays, oversight gaps and the enforcement mechanisms that were supposed to turn Nigeria’s anti-gas-flaring laws from promises into practice.



















