Small Trade, Big Risk: What Trump’s Iran Sanctions Could Mean For Nigeria & Africa
By VANCE SHERIFF
Nigeria’s Modest Iran Trade May Not Shield It From Trump’s Sanctions Pressure
THE United States has opened another front in its campaign to isolate Iran, threatening countries and businesses that continue to maintain economic relations with Tehran.
For Nigeria, the immediate risk appears relatively small because bilateral trade with Iran remains limited.
However, the wider implications are more complicated.
Washington’s use of secondary sanctions could reach beyond Iran’s biggest trading partners if the Trump administration decides that third-country businesses are helping Tehran evade economic restrictions.
That possibility has placed Africa’s growing relationship with Iran under renewed scrutiny.
A Sanctions Strategy Built Around Financial Power
The latest US threat centres on economic isolation.
Washington intends to use its influence over the international financial system to increase pressure on countries that continue doing business with Iran.
The approach effectively creates a choice for companies and governments.
They can maintain certain relationships with Tehran, but potentially risk losing access to parts of the US financial and commercial system.
That leverage gives Washington considerable influence even where the United States has little direct trade with the affected country.
Iran Has Been Building Its African Network
Tehran has spent years expanding its economic and diplomatic presence in Africa.
The strategy partly reflects Iran’s efforts to reduce dependence on traditional trading partners and navigate decades of Western sanctions.
Iran had 24 active embassies across Africa, while 19 African countries maintained diplomatic missions in Iran, according to the figures cited in the report.
Trade has also expanded.
Iran reported $1.2 billion in trade with African states in 2024 and later announced an 85 per cent increase in trade.
Although the overall figure remains modest by global standards, Tehran sees Africa as an important market for its non-oil exports and a potential source of economic partnerships.
What Iran Sells to Africa
Iran’s exports to Africa demonstrate the breadth of its commercial ambitions.
Steel and iron products feature prominently, alongside urea, petrochemicals, bitumen, cement, motor oil and food products.
In 2024, Iran exported about $680.12 million in goods to 37 African countries.
Ghana emerged as the largest African destination, receiving goods worth about $243.49 million.
Kenya followed with approximately $103.27 million, while South Africa accounted for about $80.66 million.
Iran’s African imports were smaller but still covered a number of countries.
It bought about $107 million worth of commodities from 21 African states, with South Africa, Ghana and Seychelles recording the largest values.
Nigeria Is Not a Major Iranian Trading Partner
Nigeria’s position looks markedly different.
The country does not rank among Iran’s major African export destinations or import sources.
The available data cited in the report put Iranian exports to Nigeria at only about $2.12 million.
That figure makes it difficult to classify Nigeria as a major participant in Iran’s international trading network.
Consequently, Abuja is unlikely to occupy the same sanctions-risk category as China, India, Turkey, Iraq or other countries with much larger economic relationships with Tehran.
Nevertheless, trade value alone cannot determine sanctions exposure.
Secondary Sanctions Change the Equation
The critical issue is the possibility of secondary sanctions.
Such measures can target third-country companies or institutions that engage in specified transactions with sanctioned entities.
That means an African country does not necessarily need to be a major Iranian trading partner before its companies become exposed.
Banks, insurers, shipping companies, energy firms and multinational corporations could face additional compliance risks if their transactions touch sanctioned Iranian entities.
For countries whose businesses rely heavily on access to dollar transactions and Western financial institutions, that threat can become a powerful deterrent.
African Investments Add Another Layer
Iran’s relationship with Africa also goes beyond trade in physical goods.
Telecommunications provides one example.
South Africa’s MTN Group has a 49 per cent stake in Irancell, exposing a major African corporate player to the broader consequences of US pressure on Iranian business.
Mining provides another connection.
Iran holds a stake in Namibia’s Rössing Uranium operation.
Manufacturing partnerships have also emerged.
Kenya has previously considered Iranian participation in automobile production, while Zimbabwe has worked with Iranian companies on tractor manufacturing.
These relationships could attract greater scrutiny if Washington broadens its enforcement campaign.
Experts Disagree Over Nigeria’s Risk
Yusuf Bako believes Nigeria should not dismiss the potential danger.
In his assessment, the Trump administration’s approach to sanctions is broad enough to create pressure even on countries that are not primary targets.
He warned that Nigeria’s existing diplomatic tensions with Washington could make the situation more sensitive.
The possibility of sanctions-related pressure also comes against the background of US scrutiny of Nigeria’s internal security and religious conflicts.
Bako cautioned that Abuja could face additional external pressure if Washington attempts to establish links between Nigerian actors and Iranian interests.
Another Expert Sees Limited Consequences
Lakemfa takes a different position.
He argues that US sanctions against Iran are longstanding and that Nigeria’s limited economic relationship with Tehran provides little basis for major concern.
From this standpoint, the current threat represents another phase of an established American strategy rather than an entirely new development.
He also questioned how far Washington can push financial sanctions without encouraging other countries to reduce their dependence on the dollar.
The African Balancing Act
The debate illustrates the difficult choices facing African governments.
Many countries want to diversify their economic partnerships and strengthen relations with emerging powers.
At the same time, they remain deeply connected to Western financial institutions, investment markets and currencies.
Nigeria faces this dilemma particularly sharply.
The country needs foreign investment, dollar liquidity and strong relations with the United States. Yet it also seeks broader economic partnerships that include countries outside the Western bloc.
A confrontational approach towards Iran could limit Abuja’s strategic flexibility. Ignoring American sanctions could create financial and diplomatic risks.
What Nigeria Should Watch
For Nigeria, the immediate lesson is not necessarily to abandon legitimate relations with Iran.
Rather, Abuja and Nigerian businesses may need to monitor the evolving US sanctions regime closely.
Financial institutions should pay attention to sanctioned entities and transactions. Companies with indirect Iranian exposure should also assess their compliance obligations.
Government agencies may need to coordinate more closely to prevent legitimate Nigerian businesses from inadvertently becoming exposed to sanctions.
A Small Trade Relationship With a Large Geopolitical Question
Nigeria’s direct economic relationship with Iran remains small.
Yet the consequences of US sanctions can extend beyond bilateral trade.
The real issue is Washington’s ability to influence third-country behaviour through access to the global financial system.
For Africa, that creates a delicate strategic environment.
Countries want greater freedom to trade and build partnerships across geopolitical divides. At the same time, they cannot easily ignore the economic power of the United States.
Nigeria may not currently sit at the centre of Trump’s Iran sanctions strategy. But as Washington expands its economic pressure campaign, Abuja will have to watch carefully where the lines are drawn—and ensure that its foreign-policy choices do not inadvertently expose the country’s businesses or financial system to avoidable risks.
