Beyond Election Promises: Can Amupitan Rebuild Trust In INEC Before Nigeria Votes In 2027?
By MELVIN KOFFA
INEC’s 2027 Credibility Battle: Amupitan’s London Defence Meets Protests, Court Disputes & Technology Challenges
THE preparations for Nigeria’s 2027 general elections are unfolding against a difficult backdrop of public distrust, unresolved political disputes and questions about the independence of the electoral commission.
That challenge became particularly visible on Thursday in London, where the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Prof. Joash Amupitan, defended his leadership before an audience at Chatham House, only to encounter an angry group of Nigerians in the diaspora who demanded his resignation after the engagement.
The confrontation provided a striking contrast to the chairman’s message. Inside the venue, he sought to convince Nigerians that INEC had learnt from the controversies of the 2023 presidential election and was introducing safeguards to improve the next electoral process. Outside, protesters accused the commission under his leadership of compromising its independence and favouring the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC).
Neither the chairman’s assurances nor the protesters’ accusations, by themselves, settle the question of INEC’s credibility. Instead, both developments reveal the difficult environment in which the electoral body must prepare for the next general elections.
Amupitan’s presentation, delivered during a high-level dialogue organised by Chatham House in partnership with the Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI), addressed electoral technology, judicial disputes, funding, voter registration, institutional neutrality and the role of citizens in protecting democracy.
The discussion was titled Nigeria’s 2027 Elections: Democratic Trajectory and Regional Stability Beyond the Ballot.
A public confrontation that reflects a wider crisis of confidence
As Amupitan prepared to leave Chatham House, some aggrieved Nigerians in the diaspora blocked the vehicle conveying him and demanded that he come down to address them.
The protesters accused INEC of losing its independence and acting in favour of the governing APC. One voice demanded that the chairman leave the vehicle and face the group, while security operatives attempted to restore calm.
Despite their demands, Amupitan remained seated inside the vehicle. The protesters reportedly continued shouting insults as the security personnel tried to manage the situation.
The confrontation was more than an uncomfortable encounter between a public official and demonstrators. It illustrated the continuing difficulty INEC faces in persuading sections of the electorate that it can administer elections without political interference.
However, the protesters’ allegations must be distinguished from established evidence. Their demand for the chairman’s resignation does not, on its own, prove that INEC has favoured any political party. Similarly, Amupitan’s denial of wrongdoing does not eliminate the need for public scrutiny.
The central issue is whether the commission can demonstrate impartiality through its conduct, decisions and administration of the electoral process.
That distinction matters because an electoral institution requires more than formal constitutional authority. It also needs public confidence that its procedures apply equally to all political parties and candidates.
The unfinished legacy of the 2023 presidential election
During the Chatham House discussion, Amupitan acknowledged that the 2023 presidential election had inflicted serious damage on INEC’s reputation.
He admitted that the commission had not fully recovered from the resulting trust deficit.
This acknowledgement is important because the controversies surrounding the 2023 exercise remain central to discussions about electoral credibility in Nigeria.
Rather than dismissing the criticisms, Amupitan said INEC had used subsequent off-cycle elections to identify weaknesses and improve its operational processes.
He cited the Anambra and Osun governorship elections, the Federal Capital Territory Area Council polls, the Ekiti governorship election and 16 legislative by-elections as examples of the commission’s efforts.
According to him, the recent Osun election represented a clear improvement, while administrative changes helped INEC declare results in Anambra and Osun the day after voting.
He recalled that the 2021 Anambra governorship election took approximately five days to conclude.
These examples provide an indication of the commission’s efforts to improve operational efficiency. Nevertheless, the experience of off-cycle elections cannot automatically establish readiness for a nationwide presidential contest.
General elections involve a much larger electorate, greater geographical coverage, more complex security arrangements and intense political competition. They also place greater pressure on the commission’s technological infrastructure and result-management procedures.
Consequently, the real test will be whether improvements recorded in selected elections can be sustained across all states and polling locations during the 2027 general elections.
Result transmission: The critical lessons from INEC’s internal review
Perhaps the most consequential aspect of Amupitan’s presentation concerned INEC’s review of result management after the 2023 elections.
He said the commission identified collation centres as a major source of problems, rather than attributing the difficulties exclusively to polling units.
According to him, INEC has developed technical validation safeguards to prevent inaccurate results and figures indicating over-voting from being uploaded to the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV).
The chairman explained that the system would reject results that failed the required validation process. He argued that eliminating discrepancies at the point of origin would make subsequent collation more transparent.
The proposal is intended to address concerns raised during the 2023 election, when discrepancies and controversies surrounding result transmission contributed to widespread criticism of INEC.
However, the commission’s explanation leaves important operational questions that voters, political parties and election observers will want answered.
For instance, what specific validation procedures will the system apply? How will it distinguish between genuine errors and deliberate manipulation? What happens when an otherwise legitimate result fails validation because of a technical or human error?
Moreover, how will INEC make rejected results available for correction, verification and lawful review?
These questions do not invalidate the proposed safeguards. Rather, they highlight the importance of explaining how the technology works and providing independent observers with sufficient information to assess its reliability.
Amupitan also disclosed that INEC considered adopting an entirely new electoral technology for 2027 but chose to strengthen its existing infrastructure because of the limited time before the polls.
The decision reflects a practical concern: introducing a completely new system shortly before an election could create additional operational risks. Nevertheless, upgrading existing technology must address the weaknesses that undermined confidence in earlier exercises.
BVAS improvements & the question of operational readiness
The Bimodal Voter Accreditation System remains another important component of INEC’s electoral preparations.
Amupitan acknowledged concerns about BVAS malfunctions during the 2023 elections, including problems reportedly associated with extreme heat and storage conditions.
In response, he said INEC was constructing climate-controlled storage facilities across all states. The commission had also procured additional devices and reduced the maximum number of voters assigned to each machine from 1,250 to 850.
Polling units with more than 850 registered voters would consequently receive multiple devices.
These adjustments are intended to reduce the workload on individual machines and improve accreditation efficiency. However, device availability alone cannot guarantee successful deployment.
The commission must also ensure proper storage, maintenance, technical support, power arrangements and adequate training for election officials. Furthermore, it needs contingency plans for equipment failures, network interruptions and other unexpected problems.
To test the improvements, Amupitan announced a nationwide mock accreditation and voting exercise scheduled for 28 November 2026.
The exercise is expected to simulate the presidential election and assess whether the commission can successfully conduct voter accreditation and transmit results electronically.
Its significance will depend on the quality of the exercise and what INEC does with the findings. A mock election should not become merely a public demonstration of equipment. It should expose weaknesses, test contingency arrangements and produce lessons that can inform final preparations.
Publishing meaningful information about the exercise would also help build confidence among political parties, civil society organisations and voters.
More than 300 lawsuits complicate the electoral timetable
Technology is only one part of the challenge. Amupitan also disclosed that INEC was dealing with more than 300 pending court cases ahead of the 2027 elections.
He described the volume of litigation as a major concern because the commission had already started procuring sensitive election materials.
Late judicial decisions, he explained, could force INEC to alter arrangements after significant resources had been committed to particular candidates, parties or electoral processes.
The chairman cited the leadership dispute within the African Democratic Congress (ADC) as an example.
According to his account, when the dispute emerged in April, INEC sought an accelerated hearing so the matter could be resolved within three weeks. The commission wanted sufficient time to complete its logistical preparations.
However, the case continued beyond that period and was heading to the Court of Appeal after the ADC challenged the Federal High Court’s decision nullifying the Senator David Mark-led leadership of the party.
The dispute has attracted additional attention because former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar emerged as the ADC presidential candidate under the affected leadership faction.
Asked what would happen to Atiku’s candidacy if the judgment remained in force, Amupitan said INEC was constitutionally bound to comply with final court decisions.
He specifically invoked Section 285 of the Constitution and said the commission would obey judicial pronouncements, particularly those delivered by the Supreme Court.
His response reinforces an important constitutional principle: INEC cannot substitute its political preferences for binding judicial decisions.
Nevertheless, the dispute exposes a structural difficulty within the electoral system. Court cases can continue while the electoral commission must meet fixed deadlines for candidate recognition, ballot preparation and procurement.
Can electoral litigation be concluded earlier without restricting access to justice?
To reduce the operational pressure created by pre-election disputes, Amupitan advocated reforms requiring such cases to be concluded six months to one year before election day.
The proposal deserves consideration because early resolution could give INEC greater certainty about the parties and candidates participating in an election.
It could also reduce the risk of last-minute changes to ballot papers and other sensitive materials. More importantly, it would allow the commission to plan procurement and logistics with fewer unresolved legal questions.
However, the reform must address competing constitutional considerations.
Political parties and candidates have legitimate rights to challenge disputed nominations, party leadership decisions and other pre-election matters. Any attempt to impose earlier deadlines must therefore provide sufficient time for legal proceedings and preserve access to the courts.
The challenge is not simply to prevent litigation from disrupting election preparations. It is to create a legal framework that balances electoral efficiency with the constitutional rights of political actors.
A properly designed system would require clear timelines, effective judicial case management and sufficient institutional capacity to resolve disputes without unnecessary delays.
Neutrality allegations place the chairman under scrutiny
Amupitan also used the London engagement to address allegations questioning his personal neutrality.
He denied operating an X account allegedly linked to his phone number and associated with controversial political commentary.
According to him, an independent forensic review had been obtained, while the matter had been referred to the Department of State Services and the Inspector-General of Police for investigation.
He also dismissed suggestions that his previous legal representation in political disputes could compromise his impartiality as INEC chairman.
Amupitan argued that he had acted strictly in his professional capacity as a Senior Advocate of Nigeria before his appointment.
He maintained that his loyalty was to the Constitution and the Electoral Act, rather than any political institution or officeholder.
Although these explanations address the allegations raised against him, the wider issue of institutional neutrality requires more than personal assurances.
INEC must demonstrate through its decisions that it treats political parties and candidates consistently. It must also ensure that its officials follow transparent procedures and that complaints receive credible investigation.
The allegations surrounding the X account should therefore be assessed on the basis of the forensic review and the findings of the investigating authorities, rather than speculation or political claims.
Voter register allegations & the responsibility of transparency
Questions about the accuracy of the national voter register also featured in the discussion.
Amupitan referred to allegations of an 85 per cent increase in registered voters in a ward in Ebonyi State. He said INEC had investigated the complaint and resolved it in accordance with statutory procedures.
He further explained that the Electoral Act provides periods for public claims, objections and requests for certified true copies of the register.
A credible voter register is fundamental to electoral integrity because it determines who can participate in the voting process and helps electoral authorities plan the distribution of materials and personnel.
However, allegations of unusual registration patterns can undermine public confidence if the commission does not explain the relevant figures and how it reached its conclusions.
INEC must therefore make its procedures accessible and provide sufficient information for citizens and political parties to exercise their statutory rights.
Transparent handling of complaints is especially important in an environment where electoral misinformation can spread rapidly through social media.
Election funding & the risk of delayed implementation
The chairman also disclosed that INEC had received a substantial portion of its 2027 election budget but was still awaiting the outstanding balance.
He said part of the pending funding would support the recruitment and welfare of ad hoc election personnel. According to him, the commission had received assurances that the funds would be released before the end of November.
The funding question has direct implications for the commission’s operational timetable.
INEC must recruit and train temporary personnel, procure materials, deploy technology, arrange transportation and coordinate election activities across the country. Each responsibility depends on timely access to financial resources.
A delay could therefore affect several stages of preparation, particularly where procurement and personnel arrangements require advance planning.
For that reason, the commission’s financial assurances must be matched by timely releases and transparent expenditure. Public confidence also requires clarity about how election funds are allocated and utilised.
Youth participation & the growing threat of digital misinformation
Beyond institutional and operational matters, Amupitan urged young Nigerians to remain actively involved in the democratic process.
He warned against the spread of misinformation and encouraged citizens to verify information before sharing it.
His appeal reflects the growing influence of digital platforms on election campaigns and public debate. Misleading reports, manipulated images, fabricated statements and false claims about electoral procedures can influence perceptions and deepen political tensions.
Nevertheless, citizens cannot be expected to counter misinformation effectively without access to reliable information from public institutions.
INEC must therefore strengthen its communication channels, publish accurate updates promptly and respond to credible complaints with evidence.
The commission should also make its procedures easier to understand, particularly for first-time voters and young people who increasingly engage with political issues through digital platforms.
Public education must complement technological safeguards if Nigeria is to reduce the influence of false information during the 2027 elections.
The countdown to 2027 & the test of public confidence
Nigeria will hold its presidential and National Assembly elections on 16 January 2027, followed by governorship and State Houses of Assembly elections on 6 February 2027.
As the dates approach, INEC must manage several interconnected responsibilities: improving the reliability of BVAS, validating electronic results, securing election materials, resolving administrative disputes, coordinating personnel and ensuring that the outstanding budget is released on time.
At the same time, the commission must address the trust deficit that continues to shape public reactions to its leadership.
The confrontation in London demonstrates that the chairman’s explanations have not persuaded everyone. However, public anger alone cannot establish electoral misconduct, just as official assurances cannot independently prove that the commission is prepared to deliver credible elections.
Ultimately, INEC’s credibility will depend on evidence of performance. The mock election, the implementation of result-validation safeguards, the handling of court decisions and the transparency of voter registration procedures will all provide opportunities to assess the commission’s readiness.
The wider responsibility also extends to political parties, the judiciary, security agencies, civil society organisations and citizens. Each has a role in protecting the electoral process and respecting constitutional procedures.
For Amupitan, the immediate task is to turn his promises into measurable institutional performance. For Nigerians, the task is to scrutinise the commission’s actions without allowing unverified claims to replace evidence.
The 2027 elections will therefore test more than INEC’s ability to organise voting. They will test whether the commission can demonstrate independence, transparency and accountability in an environment where public confidence remains fragile.
