Inside The Alleged 2025 Coup Plot: Colonel Ma’aji’s Account Of Grievance, Recruitment & A Plan That Never Reached ‘D-Day’
By NJORIGE LYNUS
From Grievance to Conspiracy
THE alleged 2025 attempt to overthrow President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s government has moved beyond the initial arrests and official statements into a more complicated account of how military dissatisfaction allegedly evolved into an organised conspiracy.
At the centre of the latest revelations is Colonel Mohammed Ma’aji, a 50-year-old Nigerian Army officer who investigators say played a leading role in the alleged plot.
In statements obtained during military investigations, Ma’aji offered an extensive account of what he described as a movement driven principally by patriotism, dissatisfaction with Nigeria’s deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and frustration within sections of the armed forces.
His account, however, is not itself proof of guilt. Ma’aji and other defendants have denied criminal wrongdoing, while courts are still determining the admissibility and weight of evidence presented by the prosecution.
The statements are particularly significant because they provide an insider’s account of the alleged conspiracy: how it reportedly began, why it stalled, how it was revived, how prospective participants were approached and why the plan ultimately failed to reach an agreed execution date.
A Plot That Allegedly Began Under Buhari
According to Ma’aji, the roots of the alleged movement went back to the final years of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration.
He told military investigators that increasing insecurity, corruption, perceived nepotism and the deterioration of living conditions created an environment in which some officers began discussing the possibility of military intervention.
The concerns, he said, were particularly acute among personnel who witnessed soldiers and civilians being killed in the North-East, North-West and North-Central regions.
Ma’aji portrayed the initial discussions as an attempt to identify military officers who shared what he described as a patriotic concern about Nigeria’s direction.
The distinction between political dissatisfaction and an actual coup plan, however, is central to the case. What began, according to his account, as conversations among disgruntled officers eventually developed into an effort to recruit personnel and assemble the resources required for military intervention.
Money Became a Major Constraint
The alleged movement did not immediately acquire the resources required to execute such an operation.
Ma’aji told investigators that he financed substantial portions of the early effort personally. He said he sold three houses in Kaduna State and a hostel at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, to raise money.
Other officers allegedly contributed smaller amounts, including one major who reportedly contributed ₦1 million and another officer who supplied United States dollars on several occasions.
The account illustrates one of the central weaknesses of the alleged operation: dissatisfaction alone could not translate into a successful seizure of government without command structures, personnel, logistics, weapons, communications and access to strategic locations.
The absence of those resources, Ma’aji said, caused the first phase of the movement to collapse.
Promotion Setback & the Revival
The alleged movement resurfaced after Ma’aji failed to secure promotion to brigadier general for a second time in 2024.
He rejected the suggestion that his career frustrations alone motivated the conspiracy, but acknowledged that the failed promotion became an important factor in its revival.
According to his statement, Lieutenant Colonel Shamsuddeen Bappah subsequently urged him to reconsider the abandoned plan.
Meetings were then allegedly organised in Abuja, including at Brookville Hotel and Greenland Hotel in Lokogoma.
Ma’aji said the participants discussed the country’s political and economic conditions and explored how the earlier movement could be revived.
Among the issues cited were fuel-subsidy removal, the floating of the naira, taxation, electricity tariffs, insecurity, corruption and the government’s handling of public protests.
The alleged conspiracy therefore acquired a dual character: military grievances were intertwined with broader political and socioeconomic complaints.
From Political Frustration to Military Planning
The investigation documents indicate that the alleged participants did not merely discuss Nigeria’s problems. They allegedly began considering operational questions.
Ma’aji described efforts to identify officers who could provide manpower, logistics and access to military installations.
Some officers were allegedly expected to mobilise personnel from different formations, while others were assigned responsibilities involving communications, transportation or access to strategic locations.
He also described discussions about using members of the Civilian Joint Task Force in the North-East.
According to his statement, the proposed operation would have involved the arrest of senior military officials and would have been conducted at night.
Yet the details also reveal how incomplete the alleged plan remained.
There was no final date for execution. Several possible dates were reportedly considered, including 27 September and 1st October, but no definitive “D-Day” was agreed.
Resources had not been fully secured, personnel had not been completely mobilised and the wider command structure required for such an operation remained uncertain.
The Question of Senior Military Support
One of the most consequential aspects of Ma’aji’s account is his description of the alleged effort to secure support from senior officers.
He told investigators that some senior personnel were approached or made aware of the discussions, while others were never contacted.
He specifically denied speaking with some senior military figures whose names had reportedly circulated around the investigation.
That distinction matters because a coup cannot ordinarily succeed merely through the participation of a handful of junior or middle-ranking officers.
Military hierarchy, command authority, access to formations and control of troops are fundamental to any attempt to overthrow a government.
Ma’aji’s account therefore suggests that the alleged movement faced a structural problem: it had grievances and some degree of recruitment, but had not secured the level of institutional command necessary to guarantee success.
The Alleged Villa Connection
The investigation also centres on claims involving civilians and personnel connected to the Presidential Villa.
Ma’aji described how he allegedly became connected to Inspector Ahmed Ibrahim and, through him, Zekeri Umoru, an electrician at the Villa.
According to his statement, the objective was to obtain information and potentially facilitate access to strategic areas.
Ma’aji said Umoru initially requested ₦1 billion to assist with access but that he rejected the demand, insisting that the movement was supposedly motivated by patriotism rather than money.
Such allegations are among the most serious claims contained in the investigation because access to the seat of government would have potentially provided operational advantages to coup plotters.
They remain allegations to be tested in court.
The Alleged Financing Question
The issue of financing has also become a major component of the wider investigation.
Ma’aji’s statement claimed that former Bayelsa State Governor Timipre Sylva became involved relatively late and contributed approximately ₦400 million.
Sylva has vehemently denied involvement in the alleged conspiracy.
His spokesperson previously described him as a committed democrat and said he had no involvement in either the planning or logistics of any coup attempt.
The contradiction between the colonel’s account and Sylva’s denial underscores why the courts will have to distinguish between statements made during investigation and independently corroborated evidence.
Why the Plot Failed
Perhaps the most revealing element of Ma’aji’s account is that the alleged coup never reached the stage of execution.
There was no agreed D-Day.
The alleged planners were still attempting to recruit personnel, raise funds and acquire logistics. Questions about senior command support remained unresolved.
The alleged movement therefore appears, based on Ma’aji’s own account, to have been an incomplete conspiracy rather than an operation that reached the final stage of seizing state power.
That distinction will be important in the eventual judicial determination of the charges.
Arrests and the Legal Battle
Ma’aji was arrested on 29 September 2025, according to the investigation.
The arrests were followed by a broader investigation involving serving and retired military officers, police personnel and civilians.
By February, dozens of people had reportedly been interrogated or arrested in connection with the alleged conspiracy.
Some suspects are facing proceedings before military judicial panels, while others are being prosecuted in civilian courts.
A significant legal issue has emerged over the voluntariness of statements obtained during interrogation.
Several defendants have challenged the admissibility of their written statements and interrogation recordings, prompting a trial-within-trial to determine whether the evidence was obtained voluntarily.
This means that even detailed statements such as Ma’aji’s cannot automatically be treated as established facts.
The Grievances Behind the Alleged Plot
Beyond the mechanics of the alleged conspiracy lies a broader question: why would serving military officers contemplate such an extraordinary violation of constitutional order?
Ma’aji attributed the alleged movement to dissatisfaction over low salaries, inadequate military welfare, poor treatment of wounded soldiers, pension problems, perceived favouritism in promotions and the broader economic hardship affecting Nigerians.
He also criticised fuel-subsidy removal, taxation, electricity tariffs, corruption and the quality of education.
His statement repeatedly returned to the welfare of soldiers.
He argued that personnel who risk their lives in combat should have better medical care, housing, pensions and family support.
He also called for a formal channel through which officers could communicate grievances to the Chief of Army Staff without fear of victimisation.
A Warning About Civil-Military Relations
The allegations raise questions extending beyond the defendants themselves.
Nigeria’s democratic system rests partly on the constitutional subordination of the armed forces to civilian authority. Any attempt by serving military personnel to overthrow an elected government therefore represents not simply a criminal allegation but a direct challenge to democratic institutions.
At the same time, the grievances outlined by Ma’aji raise a separate governance question: how effectively can a democratic state identify and resolve legitimate institutional frustrations before they become security threats?
The two questions should not be confused.
Poor welfare cannot justify a coup, just as dissatisfaction with government policy cannot confer constitutional authority on military officers to seize power.
But understanding those grievances may be essential to preventing future instability.
An Officer’s Change of Position
Toward the end of his statement, Ma’aji appeared to reconsider the course he had allegedly taken.
He said his experience following arrest had convinced him that there were alternative ways of communicating concerns within the military.
He appealed for leniency and pardon and said that, if released, he would not contemplate the same course again.
The statement offers an extraordinary closing contrast: an officer who allegedly helped organise an attempt to overthrow the government ultimately calling for institutional dialogue instead of military intervention.
Whether the courts accept his explanations, reject them or find parts of them credible will depend on the evidence presented during trial.
For Nigeria, however, the larger lesson may lie beyond the individual case.
The alleged plot demonstrates how economic hardship, institutional grievances, political frustration and military discontent can intersect in dangerous ways.
The constitutional answer remains clear: political grievances must be resolved through democratic institutions, not through the barrel of a gun.
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