Revisiting January 1966: Why The Igbo Bore The Burden Of A National Coup
A Lingering Question in Nigeria’s Historical Memory
MORE than six decades after Nigeria’s first military coup of 15 January 1966, one question continues to resonate strongly within Igbo political and historical consciousness: why were the Igbo people collectively punished for the actions of officers whose motivations and identities were neither exclusively Igbo nor ethnically driven? The persistence of this question underscores unresolved tensions in Nigeria’s national memory and the incomplete reckoning with its early post-independence crises.
The dominant narrative that framed the January 1966 coup as an “Igbo coup” has shaped political suspicion, policy choices, and inter-ethnic relations for decades. Yet a closer examination of the principal actors, their backgrounds, and their stated intentions challenges the ethnic label that has endured in public discourse.
Kaduna Nzeogwu and the Problem of Identity
Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, widely regarded as the face of the coup, occupies a central place in this debate. As former military head of state General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida noted in his memoir A Journey in Service, Nzeogwu was “Igbo only in name.” Born and raised in Kaduna to parents from the old Mid-Western Region, he spoke fluent Hausa and was culturally integrated into Northern society.
Nzeogwu’s own writings further complicate the ethnic interpretation. In a letter dated 17 June 1967, addressed to then-Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo, Nzeogwu expressed a desire to rebuild a Nigerian Army within Biafra that would include Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba, and other ethnic groups. This vision reflected a nationalist orientation rather than ethnic exclusivism.
His death in July 1967, following an ambush by federal troops, and his burial with full military honours in Kaduna, underscore the contradiction between his treatment by the Nigerian state and the ethnic guilt later imposed on an entire people.
Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna: A Revolutionary Without Ethnic Borders
The life of Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna further weakens the ethnic framing of the coup. Known for his rebellious activism from adolescence, Ifeajuna’s political trajectory long predated military intervention. As documented by Obasanjo, he led protests as a teenager at Dennis Memorial Grammar School and later at the University of Ibadan.
During the January 1966 events, Ifeajuna attempted to extend the coup to Enugu but was overtaken by events and later fled to Ghana. His later decision during the civil war to pursue a ceasefire with the Federal Government—an initiative aimed at reintegration rather than secession—led to his execution by Biafran authorities in 1967.
At no point did Ifeajuna articulate an ethnic Igbo agenda. Yet, like Nzeogwu, his actions were later subsumed into a narrative that collectively punished the Igbo population.
A Multi-Ethnic Coup with Nationalist Intentions
Major Adewale Ademoyega, a Yoruba officer and one of the principal coup planners, provides further evidence against ethnic reductionism. Ademoyega played a decisive role in identifying key political figures during the coup, including Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh. The group’s broader political objective, by Ademoyega’s own account, was to install Chief Obafemi Awolowo as head of government.
The January 1966 coup was therefore conceived as a corrective intervention against corruption and misrule, not an ethnic project. Its ethnic reinterpretation emerged largely from the uneven outcomes of the coup and the subsequent counter-coup of July 1966, which introduced a far more explicit ethnic dimension into Nigeria’s crisis.
Selective Memory and Unequal Judgement
Nigeria’s later military history exposes the inconsistency of ethnic labeling. The failed 1976 coup led by officers largely from the Middle Belt was never framed as a “Middle Belt coup,” despite its regional composition. Similarly, General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo and a coup target, survived the January events and attempted to restore order, yet his ethnicity did not shield the Igbo from collective blame.
Toward Historical Correction and Reconciliation
The continued association of the January 1966 coup with Igbo identity reflects political convenience rather than historical accuracy. For Nigeria to move toward genuine reconciliation, the Federal Government must formally acknowledge that the coup was not ethnically motivated.
Such an acknowledgment would not erase history but would correct its misinterpretation—opening space for honest dialogue, healing, and a more inclusive national identity grounded in truth rather than inherited suspicion.
