Precision Or Proxy? The Real Story Behind The Northwest Bombardment
ABUJA has confirmed that coordinated airstrikes hit terrorist targets in Nigeria’s Northwest, formalising a U.S.–Nigeria security partnership that has quietly expanded from training and intelligence sharing into kinetic strike support.
Ambassador Yusuf Tuggar, Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, validated the operation in a statement released by ministry spokesperson Kimiebi Ebienfa. According to Tuggar, the strikes were a result of structured counter-terror cooperation involving strategic coordination, intelligence exchange, and alignment under international law.
This confirmation followed President Donald Trump’s public declaration that the U.S. launched a Christmas Day strike targeting Islamic State militants in Sokoto State. While the Pentagon released video footage showing a missile launched from a U.S. naval platform, it offered no immediate details on casualties, locations of secondary explosions, or potential civilian impact.
The operation, according to Tuggar, does not signal a loss of Nigerian control but rather reflects “established practice and bilateral understandings” aimed at weakening terror networks, disrupting financing lines, and blocking cross-border infiltration routes.
Yet field reporting and expert analysis point to a more complex picture. The Northwest terror landscape has evolved into a hydra of actors—bandit groups adopting terror branding, Islamic State affiliates embedding among rural communities, and insurgent groups operating in heavily forested zones that cross Sokoto, Zamfara, Niger, and Katsina States, often only kilometres away from unprotected settlements.
Security analysts noted that while airstrikes offer speed and reach, they also reveal a tacit admission: Nigeria’s ground forces, though numerically large, lack the coordinated ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) depth and rapid-response strike capacity needed to hit highly mobile terror cells consistently.
Community leaders in border LGAs voiced cautious optimism but raised concerns about long-term fallout. Islamic State factions have historically weaponised retaliation narratives, framing strikes as anti-faith aggression even when civilian casualties are minimal. In a region already battling ethno-religious tension, misinformation spreads faster than mortars.
The Minister’s insistence on civilian protection, unity, and dignity was therefore strategic—attempting to pre-empt the narrative battlefield that often opens immediately after the physical one closes.
The question now is not whether the air campaign is justified, but whether Nigeria can sustain its own war once the skies go silent.
