Nigeria, South Africa & The New Washington Equation: Africa’s Risks After Trump’s Midterm Setback
By ANITA KNIGHT
ANALYSIS: A Weakened Trump, a More Uncertain Africa: The Geopolitical Stakes for Nigeria & the Continent
THE outcome of the 3rd November United States midterm elections has altered the political calculations surrounding President Donald Trump’s remaining two years in office. With Democrats securing control of both chambers of Congress, the administration now faces a legislature better positioned to investigate its decisions, obstruct its legislative programme and challenge controversial policies.
For African countries, however, the development presents a complicated diplomatic landscape. While stronger congressional opposition could create opportunities to challenge some American policies, it may also encourage Trump to pursue his international ambitions with greater reliance on executive authority.
Therefore, the central question is not simply whether the president has lost political influence at home. It is whether his domestic difficulties could make American foreign policy more unpredictable for countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Trump’s foreign policy has been shaped by three interconnected priorities. Personal relationships with foreign leaders frequently influence his diplomatic calculations. At the same time, his desire to secure a lasting political legacy encourages highly visible peace agreements, commercial deals and demonstrations of American military strength.
Beyond those considerations, Washington’s competition with China continues to shape its economic and security interests. The administration’s emphasis on American predominance in the Western Hemisphere, reflected in its interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, demonstrates its readiness to confront perceived strategic threats.
Africa occupies an important position within this wider geopolitical competition. Its critical minerals, commercial markets, transport corridors and strategic infrastructure offer opportunities that Washington does not want to surrender to Beijing.
Consequently, congressional resistance could narrow Trump’s domestic options without necessarily reducing his international ambitions. Indeed, the president may become more determined to secure foreign policy achievements that strengthen his legacy.
Historical experience supports this possibility. After Republicans lost ground in the 2006 midterm elections, President George W. Bush escalated American military involvement in Iraq.
President Barack Obama also increasingly relied on executive powers after Democrats suffered major congressional losses in 2010 and 2014. His administration pursued the Clean Power Plan through regulatory authority and negotiated the Iran nuclear deal and Paris climate agreement without seeking Senate ratification.
Trump followed a similar pattern after Republicans lost the House in 2018. Despite investigations and legislative resistance, he continued with unilateral trade measures and restrictive immigration policies. His 2019 declaration of a national emergency to redirect funding towards the proposed border wall further illustrated his willingness to use executive authority.
Likewise, President Joe Biden relied increasingly on executive instruments after Republicans captured the House in 2022.
These precedents suggest that a hostile Congress does not necessarily produce a restrained presidency. Instead, it can encourage unilateral decisions in areas where executive authority remains substantial.
Nevertheless, Democrats will have significant oversight and legislative powers when they take control on 3 January 2027. They can investigate government decisions, influence foreign assistance and defence expenditure, obstruct appointments and block additional Republican legislative proposals.
However, Trump’s veto power and the Senate’s filibuster rules will complicate efforts to reverse existing policies. Since overcoming many legislative obstacles generally requires 60 Senate votes, congressional opposition may not translate into immediate policy reversal.
Furthermore, Democrats could face political difficulties if they must publicly defend or oppose controversial tariffs, sanctions and military interventions. Their electoral victory therefore does not automatically give them control over the direction of American foreign policy.
For African governments, the consequences will depend largely on their strategic value, diplomatic relationships and capacity to negotiate with Washington.
South Africa offers one of the clearest examples of the difficulties ahead. Trump’s announcement that he intends to terminate the country’s eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, despite Congress extending the programme until December 2028, illustrates the tension between presidential authority and congressional preferences.
Pretoria’s disagreements with Washington extend beyond trade. They involve Trump’s grievances over South Africa’s domestic policies and its international alignments.
Although commercial relationships could provide opportunities for renewed engagement, congressional sympathy alone may not reverse presidential trade restrictions. Rather, Trump could intensify pressure on South Africa in an effort to secure concessions before his political influence diminishes further.
Rwanda faces a different but equally delicate situation. Its role in efforts to stabilise eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo makes it an important regional partner. Nevertheless, American sanctions against Rwanda’s defence ministry and the Zigama Credit and Savings Society indicate that strategic cooperation does not guarantee protection from presidential pressure.
For Kigali, the challenge will be to maintain its regional security relevance while managing Washington’s expectations. Its diplomatic position could become more difficult if Trump seeks visible progress in eastern Congo and regards Rwanda as an obstacle to his preferred outcome.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo, on the other hand, could benefit from the administration’s growing interest in critical minerals. Its strategic resources make it an attractive partner in the competition with China.
Moreover, Trump’s pursuit of a peace agreement could give Kinshasa additional diplomatic leverage. Yet, the opportunity should be approached cautiously.
An administration seeking a prominent foreign policy achievement may prioritise an agreement that produces immediate publicity rather than one that addresses the deeper causes of conflict. Consequently, the DRC could face pressure to accept commercial or security arrangements that offer short-term diplomatic gains while weakening its long-term negotiating position.
Kenya, Zambia and Morocco appear to enjoy comparatively stronger strategic advantages.
Kenya’s counter-terrorism cooperation and commercial networks strengthen its relevance to American security and economic interests. Zambia’s copper resources and position along the Lobito Corridor make it important to Washington’s efforts to diversify access to critical minerals and transport infrastructure.
Meanwhile, Morocco’s defence partnerships and industrial capabilities provide opportunities for continued security and commercial engagement.
However, these advantages should not be mistaken for guaranteed diplomatic influence. Major-power competition can attract investment and security cooperation without necessarily strengthening African governments’ ability to determine the terms of those relationships.
Kenya and Zambia also face a potential funding dilemma. Their substantial US-funded health programmes could benefit from stronger Democratic congressional protection. Nevertheless, the White House retains considerable discretion over funding and disbursement, creating the possibility of delays if disagreements between the executive and legislature deepen.
Egypt and Nigeria occupy a more ambiguous position because of the competing interests shaping their relationships with Washington.
Egypt’s strategic importance has encouraged American administrations to grant waivers to human-rights conditions attached to military assistance. This illustrates how security calculations can outweigh other policy considerations.
Nigeria faces a different combination of pressures. Washington has expressed concern over allegations of religious violence, while continuing to regard Nigeria as an important counter-terrorism partner.
For Abuja, the challenge will be to protect its national interests without allowing diplomatic disagreements to undermine necessary security cooperation. The government must also ensure that its engagement with Washington reflects Nigeria’s sovereignty, security priorities and economic interests.
Personal relationships could become particularly important under Trump’s transactional approach. However, Nigeria must avoid building its foreign policy around the assumption that access to the American president or individual officials guarantees favourable outcomes.
A more durable strategy would combine constructive engagement with Washington, stronger African diplomatic coordination and diversified economic and security partnerships.
The economic implications also deserve attention. Congressional confrontation over public spending could generate financial volatility, especially if disagreements affect foreign assistance, defence expenditure or wider government financing.
African economies already face elevated debt-servicing obligations and constrained access to international capital. Therefore, prolonged uncertainty in Washington could complicate planning for governments and businesses that depend on American development funding, trade relationships and investment flows.
More importantly, Africa’s strategic resources should provide a basis for stronger negotiations rather than become instruments through which external powers dictate the continent’s economic choices.
Countries with critical minerals, commercially valuable markets and strategic infrastructure must develop clearer national priorities before negotiating with Washington or Beijing. Otherwise, competition between major powers could reproduce unequal arrangements in which African countries provide resources without securing adequate long-term economic benefits.
The Democratic midterm victory therefore presents both an opportunity and a warning. Congress may provide additional checks on presidential decisions, but African governments should not assume that legislative resistance will automatically moderate Trump’s foreign policy.
Instead, they must understand the administration’s priorities, assess the strategic value of their resources and strengthen their capacity to negotiate independently.
For Nigeria in particular, a coherent foreign policy should balance security cooperation with economic diplomacy, protect national interests and avoid excessive dependence on the political preferences of any American administration.
Ultimately, Trump may have suffered a significant domestic political setback, but his international ambitions remain intact. With fewer opportunities to advance his legislative agenda, he could turn increasingly towards foreign policy to secure visible achievements before leaving office.
Africa must therefore prepare for a period in which American engagement could become more transactional, more personalised and potentially more coercive.
The real test for African leaders will be whether they can convert the continent’s strategic importance into meaningful bargaining power, rather than simply respond to decisions made in Washington.
