Rearranged History: Why Three States Left The Eastern Bloc

THE placement of Akwa Ibom, Cross River, and Rivers States within Nigeria’s South-South geopolitical zone is often treated as a settled fact of modern governance. Yet historically, culturally, and economically, their separation from the old Eastern Region is a relatively recent political outcome—shaped less by identity than by colonial administration, military state creation, and post-civil-war calculations.
Understanding why these states occupy their current geopolitical space requires revisiting Nigeria’s pre-independence structures and the political decisions that followed the civil war.
The Eastern Region Before State Fragmentation
Before Nigeria’s current federal arrangement, the Eastern Region encompassed much of what is today referred to as both the South East and the South-South. The region included Igbo-dominated areas as well as minority ethnic groups along the Niger Delta and Cross River basin.
Trade routes linked riverine and hinterland communities. Markets, missionary education, transport networks, and political institutions were shared. Social interaction—including intermarriage and labour migration—cut across what would later become rigid state boundaries.
At the time, there was no concept of “South-South” as a distinct geopolitical identity. Regional belonging was defined administratively and economically, not by modern zoning logic.
Colonial Roots of Division
The British colonial administration governed Nigeria through indirect rule, prioritising administrative convenience and resource extraction over cultural coherence. Coastal and riverine areas were managed differently from inland territories, planting early seeds of differentiation.
However, these divisions remained within a single Eastern Region until the final years of colonial rule. The real rupture occurred not under civilian governance but through military intervention.
The Civil War and the Fear of a Unified East
Following Nigeria’s independence and the outbreak of the 1967–1970 civil war, federal authorities grew increasingly wary of the political and economic strength of a united Eastern bloc.
Oil discoveries in the Niger Delta heightened these concerns. Control of oil-producing areas became strategically critical, particularly as the war disrupted national revenues.
In 1967, the military government under General Yakubu Gowon created Rivers State out of the Eastern Region—one of the earliest and most consequential state creations. The move weakened the secessionist Eastern structure and ensured federal control over oil resources.
Post-War State Creation and Political Strategy
After the war, successive military governments accelerated state creation as a tool for political management. Cross River State emerged from the former South-Eastern State, and in 1987, Akwa Ibom State was carved out of Cross River.
These divisions were not driven by cultural incompatibility with the Igbo heartland but by political calculations: fragmenting power centres, appeasing minority demands, and redistributing access to federal resources.
The eventual emergence of the South-South geopolitical zone grouped oil-producing and coastal states together for administrative balance, reinforcing distinctions that were politically useful but historically fluid.
Geopolitical Zones as Administrative Constructs
Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones, introduced informally in the late 1990s, were never enshrined in the constitution. They were designed to simplify federal appointments, resource allocation, and political bargaining—not to define identity.
As such, the placement of Akwa Ibom, Cross River, and Rivers within the South-South reflects administrative logic rather than ancestral reality. Cultural continuities with the old Eastern Region remain evident in language overlaps, trade patterns, and shared historical experiences.
Why the Debate Persists
Discussions about where these states “belong” persist because history did not disappear—it was reorganised. Political boundaries shifted faster than social memory.
While many residents today embrace South-South identity, historical consciousness continues to surface during debates on marginalisation, federal representation, and regional solidarity.
The question, therefore, is not whether the current map is legitimate, but why it was drawn the way it was.
Nigeria’s political geography is not immutable. It reflects layers of decisions made under colonial rule, military governance, and post-war statecraft—each leaving an imprint that continues to shape national discourse.
