Inside Aburi: How Dialogue Failed To Stop Nigeria’s Civil War
A Federation on the Brink
BY early January 1967, Nigeria was facing an existential crisis. Barely seven years after gaining independence from Britain, the country had been pushed to the edge by political rivalry, ethnic distrust and violent military interventions. The coups of 1966 had not only dismantled the First Republic but also shattered confidence among Nigeria’s regions and within the armed forces themselves. Against this backdrop of fear, suspicion and escalating violence, Nigerian leaders turned to dialogue as a last resort.
That effort culminated in the Aburi Conference, held between 4 and 5 January 1967 in Aburi, a quiet hill town near Accra, Ghana. What emerged from the meeting would later be celebrated as a bold attempt at peace—and criticised as a missed opportunity whose collapse paved the way for civil war.
Why Aburi, Why Ghana?
The choice of Aburi was both symbolic and strategic. Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Military Governor of the Eastern Region, had repeatedly expressed concerns about his personal safety within Nigeria following the July 1966 counter-coup and the mass killings of Easterners in parts of the North. Ghana, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Joseph Ankrah, offered neutral ground and security assurances acceptable to all parties.
The serene environment of Aburi contrasted sharply with the political tension gripping Nigeria. It was hoped that distance from domestic pressures would allow frank discussions and rebuild trust among leaders who now viewed one another with deep suspicion.
Key Actors and Expectations
The conference brought together the leadership of the Federal Military Government and the military governors of the regions. At the centre was Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria’s Head of State, and Ojukwu, who had emerged as the most vocal critic of federal authority following the crises of 1966. Senior military officers and advisers were also present.
The stated objective was to preserve Nigeria’s unity while preventing further bloodshed. Yet beneath this shared goal lay conflicting visions of what the Nigerian federation should look like. For the Eastern Region, the priority was security, autonomy and safeguards against domination. For the federal authorities, maintaining central authority and national cohesion remained paramount.
The Aburi Resolutions
The discussions produced a set of agreements commonly known as the Aburi Accord. Central to these resolutions was the affirmation that the Supreme Military Council (SMC) would be the highest governing authority in Nigeria and that its decisions should be taken collectively. This provision was intended to reassure regions that no unilateral decisions affecting their interests would be imposed by the centre.
There was also consensus on the need for extensive consultation among regions and respect for regional sensitivities, particularly in matters of security. Given the ethnic imbalance and mistrust within the military after the coups, the reorganisation of the armed forces featured prominently in the discussions. The aim was to prevent any region from perceiving the army as an instrument of domination by another.
The spirit of Aburi was unmistakably conciliatory. Participants publicly rejected violence and emphasised compromise as the only path to national survival.
Conflicting Interpretations
Despite the optimism generated in Ghana, the Aburi resolutions were plagued by ambiguity. The agreements were not clearly codified, leaving room for conflicting interpretations once the parties returned to Nigeria.
Ojukwu maintained that Aburi effectively devolved power to the regions, reducing the federal government to a coordinating authority. He argued that decisions affecting any region required unanimous approval within the Supreme Military Council. Gowon and federal officials, however, insisted that Aburi promoted consultation without dismantling Nigeria’s federal structure or weakening central authority.
This divergence proved fatal.
Decree No. 8 and the Breakdown of Trust
In an attempt to formalise the Aburi decisions, the Federal Military Government drafted Decree No. 8. Rather than bridge the gap, the decree deepened suspicion. Ojukwu rejected it outright, claiming it fundamentally altered the spirit and letter of the Aburi agreements.
Trust between the parties collapsed rapidly. Dialogue was replaced by recrimination, while military and political preparations intensified on both sides.
From Dialogue to War
By May 1967, the crisis reached its climax. Citing the federal government’s failure to protect Easterners and honour the Aburi resolutions, Ojukwu declared the Eastern Region an independent state—the Republic of Biafra. The federal government rejected the secession, viewing it as a direct threat to Nigeria’s sovereignty.
In July 1967, Nigeria descended into civil war. The conflict would last nearly three years, claiming over a million lives and leaving deep scars on the nation’s social and political fabric.
Aburi’s Enduring Legacy
Today, the Aburi Conference is remembered as Nigeria’s last genuine attempt to resolve its internal crisis through peaceful dialogue before war became inevitable. Historians describe it as a moment rich with promise but undermined by mistrust, vague commitments and weak implementation mechanisms.
More than half a century later, Aburi remains a reference point in debates on federalism, decentralisation and conflict resolution. Its lesson is sobering: dialogue alone is insufficient without clarity, sincerity and a shared commitment to honour agreements.
